

## LINGUISTIC CRITERIA OF INTENTIONALITY.

**Khoshbakova Kumush**

Termez state university

Student of group 403 of the Faculty of Foreign Philology

**Abstract.** The aim of this paper is to discuss theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposed lycritical for intentional sentences. The papers starts with distinguishing two issues that arise when one thinks about intentional expressions: the Taxonomy Problem and the Fundamental Demarcation Problem. The former concerns the relation between the classes of distinct intentional verbs and distinct intentional states. The latter concerns the question about how to distinguish intentional states and acts from the non-intentional ones. Next, the general desiderata for theories providing criteria for singling out the class of intentional sentences are in troduced. Finally, distinct proposals for providing such criteria are analyzed. Author argues that neither is satisfactory.

**Keywords:** intentionality, intentional sentences, linguistic criteria of intentionality

The linguistic view of intentionality embraces theories that attempt to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences. In the pages that follow I shall argue that this strategy breaks down at the very start: the criteria in question fail to distinguish the latter class. In part 1, I shall review the crucial problems that arise when one addresses the issue of the relation between intentional language and intentional states. In part 2.1., I shall discuss the general desiderata that every adequate theory of intentional speech must satisfy. In sections 2.2.–2.8., I shall discuss various proposals for which criteria should be used for singling out the class of intentional states (CIS, henceforth) Regardless of the answer to the question of whether intentionality is the mark of every mental state, one has to agree that at least some mental states are intentional. The property of being intentional has been tradition-ally explicated into two different (and sometimes competing) manners. The first, discussed extensively in the early Brentano school, attempted to describe intentionality as aboutness, that is, the fact that mental states seem to be directed towards

transcendent objects. The second, also originating in the Brentano school, pursued the description of intentionality as content fullness, that is, the fact that some mental states have content. The highly theoretical notion of content has been the subject of at least two competing interpretations too: object dependent and object-independent<sup>1</sup>. The former stressed out that content is the manner of presentation or the mental picture of the object of intentional state. The latter enabled contents to be detached from the possible objects of intentional states, thus allowing for the object-independent thoughts. After more than 150 years, the debates regarding the object-content distinction as well as those about the object-dependent and object-independent intentionality still remain at the very heart of philosophical disputes concerned with the representational capacities of the mind. Some philosophers might have hoped that the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy would bring progress and clarity to such debates. However, it turned out relatively quickly that looking at intentionality through the lens of language in lieu of bringing light may obscure the phenomenon in question. This can probably be best illustrated by the predominant relationalist conception of propositional attitudes that emerged in the contemporary analytic philosophy. When asked about the nature of propositional attitudes many philosophers would describe them as relational mental states that relate agents to objects called “propositions” or “propositional contents”<sup>2</sup>. Thus (to mention a few prominent examples), for Fodor, according to standard formulation “(...) to believe that P is to bear a certain relation to a token of a symbol which means that P.” (Fodor, 1987, p. 135), for Salmon and Soames “Propositions are what we believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment about” (Salmon, Soames, 1988, p. 1), and in Chalmers’ coordination account “(...) there are two relevant sorts of relations between subjects and enriched propositions: endorsement and belief” (Chalmers, 2011, p. 619). It seems, however, that all such relationalists’ accounts are theoretical byproducts of (independently fascinating) inquiries into the logical form of attitude sentences (which are obviously relational). For the time being, nonetheless, I will leave the issue of the supposed relational nature of attitudes untouched and I shall address two matters that, at first sight, might seem to fit much better to the methods and goals of the linguistic analysis. The first problem I shall call the Taxonomy Problem. Probably all theories of intentionality distinguish two aspects of every intentional state: its content (or, if one prefers, object) and its psychological mode<sup>4</sup>. When, for instance, Kate thinks that she will win the first lottery prize and, at the very same time, she desires to win the first

lottery price, it is said that Kate is in two content identical states that differ with respect to the psychological mode (one being that of thinking and the other that of desiring). When we attempt to describe a general form of intentional explanations (and make place for intentional laws or law-like generalizations), what matters is usually the taxonomy based on psychological modes. One question that immediately arises here is, how many distinct kinds of intentional states do we want to employ in such explanations? One possible answer to that question is endorsed by the following hypothesis: The distinction between kinds of intentional states corresponds to the distinction between kinds of intentional verbs. On the one hand, nobody doubts that two synonymous intentional verbs correspond to the same type of intentional state (if any). But this is hardly interesting as: it is a simple consequence of the fact that two synonymous predicates correspond to the same property (if any). On the other hand, probably nobody has ever claimed that all linguistically encoded kinds of constraints that can be put on states of cognitive agents are relevant for the individuation of their states qua intentional states. The verbs “know” and “believe”, for instance, are clearly non-synonymous, however, it is very likely that they indicate a single kind of intentional state: the belief. This suffices to establish that the correspondence aforementioned in the hypothesis must be partial and that, if one wants to approach the Taxonomy Problem through the analysis of intentional speech, imposing additional constraint on nonsynonymous classes of intentional verbs seems obligatory. An obvious candidate for such a constraint employs the concept of intentional explanation. It states that two nonsynonymous intentional verbs denote a single kind of intentional state if and only if there are no intentional laws (or law-like generalizations that might play a role in intentional explanations) that make use of one verb but could not have made use of the other (when employed in intentional explanations). The idea is that, roughly speaking, two verbs denote a single kind of intentional state in the case where all Ramsey sentences that generalize over the appropriate verbs, and which are derived from the relevant laws or law-like generalizations, happen to be logically equivalent. In a series of important writings Robert Stalnaker has contrasted two approaches to the problem of intentionality. One is the linguistic picture that takes mental states to “(...) represent the world because of their resemblance to, or relation with, the most basic kind of representations: linguistic expressions” (Stalnaker, 1984, p. 5), the other is the pragmatic picture that invites us to think of representational mental states “(...) in terms of the role

that they play in the characterization and explanation of action”(ibid., p. 4). Although the linguistic view of intentionality discussed in this paper, i.e. the approach that attempts to single out the class of intentional states by appealing to factors that are supposedly criterial for intentional sentences, has far less serious ambitions and scope than the linguistic picture qua characterized by Stalnaker, there can be no doubt that it may be considered as a not totally unimportant part of the latter. From that point of view the present considerations might be seen as indirectly supporting the pragmatic picture. I can only hope that together with other considerations, like Tałasiewicz’s recent attempt (Husserlian in spirit) to derive basic semantic categories from basic types of intentional acts (cf. Tałasiewicz, 2010), it will make the case for a precise and self-critical version of the theory that describes intentionality as essentially connected with the “characterization and explanation of action”.

#### **REFERENCES**

- 1.Алехина А.И. Семантические группы в фразеологии современного английского языка. – М., 1977.
2. Смиринцкий А.И. Синтаксис английского языка. – М., 1957
3. Tursunov U., Muxtorov J. Hozirgi o'zbek adabiy tili. – T., 1975
4. Budagov, R. A. 1967. Literaturnye iazyki I iazykovye stili. [Literary languages and language styles] Moscow: Vysshaya Shkola.
5. <https://uz.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinonimlar>
6. J.K.Solijonov “Tarjimonlarga tavsiyalar 1-5-qismlar”